Ground ploy expresses "Guilt over the North American genocide," and from there, the possibilities are as endless as they are enticing. The second writer to hack through the apparently unbreakable tie between horror and fear is the philosopher Eugene Thacker, who had this to say about the meaning of horror:
I would propose that horror be understood not as dealing with human fear in a human world (the world-for-us), but that horror be understood as being about the limits of the human as it confronts a world that is not just a World, and not just the Earth, but also a Planet (the world-without-us). This also means that horror is not simply about fear, but instead about the enigmatic thought of the unknown. […] Horror is about the paradoxical thought of the unthinkable. In so far as it deals with this limit of thought, encapsulated in the phrase of the world-without-us, horror is "philosophical." But in so far as it evokes the world-without-us as a limit, it is a "negative philosophy" (akin to negative theology, but in the absence of God).
Briefly, the argument […] is that "horror" is a non-philosophical attempt to think about the world-without-us philosophically.
14 To which I would add: horror is also the thought that we are turning the world-for-us into the world-without-us. Horror expresses, in other words, not only a philosophical contemplation of the act, but also of the fact that we are committing it.
Four points specific to horror as a genre seem to me to provide adequate confirmation for my suspicion. They are: the themes of horror; the normalization of abnormality and the rejection of the future; the viewer's alignment with Evil, and the split between viewer alignment and allegiance.
The Themes of Horror
Horror films involving gangs of evil children address guilt thematically in a way that points directly at the guilty involvement of their audience.
14 Thacker 8-9 (emphases original).
To cite just a few examples: In Fritz Kiersch's Children of the Corn (1984) , the children in a small Midwestern farming community murder all adults in the town because the adults are destroying the earth through pesticides and other forms of irresponsible farming. In Wolf Rilla's iconic 1960 film Village of the Damned, the English village of Midwich is in danger of losing its entire adult population to a coldblooded killer gang of blond-haired, glowing-eyed children of dubious paternity-in fact, the film's working title, The Midwich Cuckoos, suggests strongly that it is uncertainty of progeny that is the film's real horror, not its overt theme of alien invasion. The town's adults solve the problem of being faced with a gang of insubordinate children by dropping the A-bomb on the barn in which the children have congregated, wiping them all out in one go. Village of the Damned has been read, and correctly I think, as an expression of atomic fears of the late 1950s, but never, to my knowledge, as the thinly veiled guilt trip for the attack on Hiroshima that it so clearly is. Such links are even more unmissable in Narciso Ibáñez Serrador's rather ironically titled ¿Quién puede matar a un niño? (1976) cleansing is currently on display: 14 million children in the Second World War, the total death toll of which has been estimated at 60 million; 1.2 million children-out of a total death toll of 2 million people-in the Indo-Pakistani war; over half a million children-out of a death toll of 1.2 million people-in the Korean War; 1.8 million children out of a total death toll of 3 million people in Vietnam; 390,000 children out of a death toll of half a million people in Biafra. More often than not, then, the statistical survival rate for adults in war, including that of soldiers in combat, is considerably higher than that of children. While the child gang's motivation in Serrador's film remains obscure without this documentary prequel, its inclusion obviously defines the film as a revenge flick on a grand scale.
Notably, none of these films link guilt to individual evil deeds, instead confronting us with a universal guilt (hence, we might suspect, the recurring gangtheme) that is not always directly tied to moral transgression and for which, as a result, nobody assumes responsibility. This is, in fact, the horror film's usual modus operandi, and it is also what makes guilt as inescapable as original sin. We might think of this in terms of the hardwiring of built-in human imperatives versus the software of personal decision-making: the software we can re-write, the hardwiring we can't. Horror films portray both kinds of guilt, personal and universal, software and hardwiring. A direct link between the horrors on screen and (someone else's)
transgression-a fisherman is run over by a bunch of drunk teens, knows what they did last summer, and comes back to slaughter them one by one-does not directly implicate the viewer. But when a horror film attacks human hardwiring, it goes for everyone's jugular. Hard-wired convictions include truisms that are so universal as to be near-inescapable: Families are the pillars of society. Children are innocent.
Fighting for freedom is noble. Democracy is the best of all possible political systems.
Kind-hearted capitalism is possible. The human race must survive at all costs.
Individual sacrifice is acceptable, even noble, in order to save the community / the country / the world. Guilt uncoupled from moral wrongdoing arises from an unquestioning faith in these hard-wired imperatives: the destruction of our planet, for example, is a direct result of human progress and development. We're simply keeping warm when our forebears could not. That we have the right to keep warm, the right to survive, the right to provide an even warmer place for our children, is part of the hardwiring that we find exceedingly difficult to question. The horror guilt-trip is payback for our inability to see the destruction caused by our most dearly held convictions.
A number of horror films serve up guilt in the absence of a crime, which is another way of saying that they work purely on the level of 'hardwiring.' In such films, nobody is, on the face of it, guilty of anything. The horrors unfolding on the screen are explicitly linked to guilt, but that guilt is not linked to any individual harmful decision. A good example is Moreau and Palud's Ils (Them, 2006) , in which a gang of children terrorize and murder an adult couple because, as the film's final line states, "They wouldn't play with us!" To take this literally, that is: to read this as a film about child neglect, would be a stretch. Until the final line, child neglect simply does not come up in the film, and the actions of the evil children are as incomprehensible to the audience as they are to the hunted couple. "They wouldn't play with us!" is sprung on the viewer at the very end, as a retrospective motivator for the entire story. In the narrative context of this particular film, the explanation is absurdly enacted that it practically trumps the terror the scene seeks to create: there is an 'Aaaawwwww, how cute'-quality about it that contrasts absurdly with, but also quite overpowers, the visual reminders of the awful reality behind the game-gaping wounds, Ruth's charred face, blood everywhere.
Peculiarly, the film makes absolutely no distinction between these deadly games and 'normal' kid behaviour. Although we must assume, particularly given the ending with its talk of embarking on a search for new toys, that the children fully plan to kill everyone the minute they set foot into the house, all killings are apparently motivated by anger at situations that are part and parcel of every child's life-for instance being shouted at for playing with things you're not supposed to touch, being belittled, being beaten at a board game. The film portrays no qualitative difference between these normal tantrums and gory murder. Thus the film casts murder not only in terms of interaction among children, but also in terms of the interaction between adults and children. Significantly, all children are 'assigned' an adult: Hannah latches onto Ralph; Susan willingly submits to Ruth's mothering; David plays chess with
Harvey and wants to be his 'friend;' Moe develops a very cuddly relationship with
Lovely. But if this seems to imply, at least initially, a 'normal' child-adult relationship, with the adult in authority over the child and the child in training to become an adult, the viewer is soon disabused of this idea. All men in the film are defined by careerism and greed: Papa Doc, the film's Alpha Male, brags tirelessly about his own 'achievements' and riches; the other men are cast as little more than circling sharks, jockeying for position and hoping for offal from his table. All women are defined by sex: the wanton (Lovely), the willing (Julie), and the frigid lush Ruth who rejects
Harvey's increasingly desperate sexual advances in favour of her love affair with Jim
Beam. There are no adults in this film that could serve as role models for children; if these characters are as good as it gets, adulthood richly merits rejection.
Indeed, the 'natural' link between children and adults, and adulthood as the natural and inevitable future of childhood, is refused several times throughout the film.
When Julie, for example, comments on the children's strange behaviour, Rick offers an explanation: 'Kids today,' he tells her, 'are smoking pot at ten and a bong at twelve.
So we're not gonna be expecting them to be normal like us.' Kids, in other words, are not little adults-in-training; they are fundamentally different from adults, 'strange' in the sense of 'abnormal.'
One of the most disturbing instances of child abnormality-and this would, at least in Rick's judgment of 'kids today', apply not only to the Fearsome Five but to children in general-is the film's premise that children, unlike adults, are authentic Isn't-this-fun kiddie slaughterfest of parents feebly trying to defend themselves against a gang of murderous children (final score: kids 4, adults 3). Postproduction interviews with the adults on the set reveal both that they experienced severe trauma watching scenes in which the children killed adults and presumed a similarly traumatic experience on the part of the children. Actor Jeremy Sheffield, who played the first father figure dispatched, describes that considerable effort went into minimizing such trauma for the children: 'We went through different games, exercises, play […] to make it very clear to the kids that it's a game, it's not real, whatever happens is not real, no matter how real it seems, it's not.' 17 But Eva
Birthistle, who played the last mother standing, seemed aware that such caution was unnecessary: 'their confidence just grew, like in the first week, then they were sort of… delighted that they were gonna kill us all [giggles] .' Jane Karen, Child Wrangler on the set, confirms this impression with reference to one particularly traumatic scene:
There's a little girl who has to stab her mother in the eye with a pencil, and she really likes it. She's been really… good at that. They're just much better at the kind of bangbang you're dead!-kind of games than you imagine, they're quite gory in their playing, and so it's not a big leap for them, whereas as adults we get very sensitive about [gasps] 'How do you, you know, explain this,' and those kids go: 'Oh yeah, I'm covered in blood, aren't I, because I just stabbed Mum Di…'
Horror films in which children gang up on adults turn child psychology on its head. They take the entire idea of 'normalization' out of the hands of adults who, diegetically, uphold their fondest illusions of control by severely underestimating murderous children as 'a little strange,' and extra-diegetically are at a loss to explain why playing at killing adults is so much fun. The gasps and the giggles indicate a considerable level of discomfort with the fact that the adults' desperate incantations that these murders are 'not real, whatever happens is not real' are apparently completely wasted on the kids. Adults need the distinction between games and reality; children don't. Adults need to repay their ghastly deeds in coin of guilt; children don't.
Guilt is thereby cast as something that adults own, that properly belongs to the adult world, and only there. It is hardly a leap to read the narrative of horror movies involving child gangs both as metaphor and as manifesto: let's bring home to adults that which belongs to them.
Viewer Alignment with Evil: The Psychopathic Moment
As guilt flicks, horror films focus our attention on Evil, not the battle between Evil may result in guilt, but at least it propels the viewer from the place of Fear, the victim's position-always held by Good, in horror-and into a position of power.
Some philosophers have, in fact, built a fundamental definition of Evil on this very dialectic. Fred Alford, for example, has argued that if the desire to combat fear is a natural impulse, then identification with Evil is not an aberration but simply a human trait, a "psychopathic moment" that everyone experiences:
The psychopathic moment is a virtually universal moment in all lives. When we are faced with intolerable, uncontainable dread, the natural tendency is to identify with the persecutor, becoming the agent of doom, as the only way of controlling it. Evil is the attempt to inflict one's doom on others, becoming doom, rather than living subject to it. In this sense evil is bad faith, the lie that one could escape one's fate by inflicting it on others. 25 23 "Wer sich an die starke Schulter eines beruflich qualifizierten männlichen Retters anlehnt, ist im Horrorfilm schon so gut wie tot" (Moldenhauer, Spehr and Windszus, "Law of the Dead" 13; my translation). 24 See, for instance, Pomerance in his "Introduction" to Bad: "The villain we abhor is precisely the figuration we cannot accept as a version of ourselves, the screen on which we cannot see ourselvesour discrete and self-absorbed selves-projected. And the gorier the image-by the end of the twentieth century screen imagery had reached new heights of gore-the more easily we can deny it, withdraw into a narcissistic paradise where the world is perfect as long as we do not have to reach out and touch it" (17). 25 Alford 58.
dungeons of horror shows us why horror films concern themselves more with guilt than with fear. Horror films are fictionalized "psychopathic moments" in which viewers are faced with the alternative between fear and guilt and the option to choose guilt as the safer route. To "identify with the persecutor" is the only way to avoid being terrified. We pay for our rejection of fear (the victim's position) in coin of guilt (by assuming the perp's position), although guilt will hardly deter us: "most of us feel guilty, at least sometimes. Neither guilt nor empathy will change this tendency to inflict terror on others, however." 26 "Terror," in Alford's reasoning, shifts meaning, from fear (of Evil) to guilt (the terror of recognizing ourselves as Evil). "We do not feel terror and then identify with the aggressor, or at least that is not the whole story.
The terror stems from the identification with the aggressor, his aggression suddenly our own, directed against those we care about and depend on, including ourselves and our values." 27 And that, I think, is the second central aspect of horror: not only does it showcase the "psychopathic moment" when the viewer may choose guilt over fear, it also puts its finger on the gaping wound created by the viewer's simultaneous alignment with Evil and presumed allegiance to Good.
The split between alignment ('identity') and allegiance ('identification')
Films assign to viewers a specific point of view, which can be termed, somewhat muddily, an 'identity,' or more clearly: an alignment 28 (through, for instance, camera angles or voice-over narration). They also invite viewers to 'identify' (or more clearly: to form an allegiance), usually to the film's hero or victim. In most 26 Alford 59. 27 Alford 59. 28 I am adopting here Murray Smith's use of the terms 'alignment' and 'allegiance' to replace the murkier, if more popular and intuitive, terms 'identity' and 'identification.' genres (e.g. romantic comedies, thrillers, detective genres), alignment ('identity') and allegiance ('identification') are yoked together. However, horror films, and particularly those focusing on evil children, separate the two to a degree unusual and unworkable in other cinematic genres. Most often, horror films achieve this by forcing viewers into the visual perspective of the guilty party. Viewer allegiance is steered towards the victims of violence; visual alignment is linked with the murderous children's through first-person point-of-view camera angles. As a result, there really is no acceptable way of seeing a horror film since the viewer is forced into the perspective of either killer or victim:
either you identify with the slasher-you'd like to have a razor-sharp, footlong machete in hand as well-or you identify with the worthless victim whose spectacular dismemberment you too merit.
[…] Those unenviable viewing positions don't leave the audience much room to maneuver. Either you wish you had the power to carve up a score of unsuspecting victims or you envy the dead. The only way to prove yourself immune from the noxious influence of these dangerous films is […]: You must denounce them. […] acknowledging that you are a latter-day horror fan is tantamount to announcing that you too are a monster.
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From the outset, then, horror places its viewers into an impossible viewing position: "The terror of the victim is supplanted by the delight of the torturer, which is being consciously shared by the audience: that is the source of horror." 30 Horror films featuring evil children achieve this by using visual alignment-most often POVshots-to assign guilt to the two least likely parties (in the viewers' minds): children 34 Some of that contempt may actually be unearned: the audience, Stephen King has claimed, is often not all that much smarter. "When they're watching a horror movie, everyone in the audience knows the hero or the heroine is stupid to go up those stairs, but in real life they always do-they smoke, they don't wear seat belts, they move their family in beside a busy highway where the big rigs drone back and forth all day and all night" (Pet Sematary 229). and eating, giggling and commenting, even betting on the youngsters' survival chances. In one particularly repellent scene, the bureaucrats watch two of the doomed teenagers going off into the woods with explicit intentions (even these intentions are not entirely down to teen hormones, but manipulated by pheromones injected into the 35 As pointed out by Derry, Dark Dreams 2.0 6. 36 Huddleston described the film, in the week of its London release, as "not just as a celebration of horror cinema, but as a compilation of its greatest hits and, perhaps, as an epitaph" ("Time Out's 100 best horror films" 62). For an interpretation, see Bernice Murphy 15-47 and Kimberly Jackson, "Metahorror." 37 See her works "Her Body, Himself" and Men, Women, and Chain Saws. scenario by the lab-coated technicians) and take bets on whether the girl will have time to disrobe before the zombies get her.
What, if anything, could justify such despicable behavior? The stated purpose of the slaughter is to 'appease the monsters': in the world of the lab-coated bureaucrats, despite its sterile appearance, every nightmare creature, from zombies to Dracula to Frankenstein's monster, is real. The only way to prevent these monsters from destroying the world is through an annual blood sacrifice, which takes the form of the stereotypical horror flick. The two surviving teens manage to break through from the lab-engineered woods to the lab itself, unleashing the monsters on the bureaucrats, at which point the film turns into the unsurprising-yet-gratifying apocalyptic revenge-flick. At the end of the whole mess, the Director 38 informs the two teenagers that the monsters will destroy the entire world unless the two sacrifice themselves willingly: "You can die with the world or for the world," she informs her lab-rats. And here is the problem for the viewer: hardwiring compels us to believe that, to quote The Wrath of Khan, "the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few."
But then we remember the lab coats making bets and rooting for a girl under death sentence to bare her tits, and the Director's ethical repackaging of slaughter as noble sacrifice begins to stick in our craw. The surviving teens, too, will have none of it.
And so the Director's moral appeal goes down like a lead balloon, and the survivors decide that a world in which humans are capable of the deliberate slaughter of others, even in the 'cause' of human survival, should go down in flames. Apocalypse now, they say. "Let someone else have a shot."
38 Played by Sigourney Weaver. In typical horror cross-film self-referentiality, Weaver's image signals the viewer that even Alien's Ripley, that rare proponent of humane behavior, has changed sides. Formerly a killer of monsters in defense of humanity, she now manages monsters by feeding them humans; from her abject position as conscientious objector and worst pain in the Company's tail, she has moved directly into its top job.
(allegiance) is with the embattled teenagers, but equally obviously, we are identified (aligned) with the lab-coated jerks behind the screen. Like these watchers, we are following, on a screen, the spectacle of teenagers being gorily killed. Like the watchers, we take bets on their survival chances and the order of their deaths, and, perhaps, some of us are also waiting to see if the little slut will bare all before being dispatched. But equally obviously, the alignment between the viewers of the film and the lab-coated watchers is not total since viewers of the film are observers of both scenarios, the one in the cabin and the one in the lab. The guilt question arises immediately: if viewers, somehow missing the rather obvious point that they-the watchers outside of the film-are aligned with the watchers within the film, treat these characters as distinct from themselves, they might not go so far as to examine their own complicity and guilt. But they would certainly still wonder why the watchers inside don't feel any. If these characters appear as too stupid and arrogant to feel fear before the monsters descend upon them, guilt is even less of an issue: they are absolutely and resolutely amoral, refusing to accept the 'reality' of the kids in the cabin just as viewers refuse to accept the 'reality' of the characters in a horror film.
Viewer attitudes towards the watchers might well be determined by these two 'lacks': their lack of fear and their lack of guilt. We want them to feel fear, certainly: but this-wanting to watch their fear, wanting to watch them being punished-is a low impulse (which the film is happy to satisfy, in spades). Surely the more moral viewer impulse would be wanting the watchers in the film to experience guilt: if fear represents mere punishment, guilt would be a moral response. If they (or we) cannot be made to feel this, then it really is time for the apocalypse, to "Let someone else have a shot." A guilt-free world is not worth saving.
There are fleeting instances in the film that indicate what it would take to really save the world. A white-coat expresses a brief moment of faux compassion for a girl being mauled by a zombie ("I almost feel sorry for her," is his not-very-heartfelt comment). One black (!) man refuses to participate in the betting and looks a bit squeamish, but stops well short of protest or rebellion. A white woman (!) hesitantly places her bets and stalls the proceedings by pointing out repeated technical problems-her way, perhaps, of asking whether this is really the only way. (All the white men in the film, incidentally, are completely untroubled by pangs of guilt or squeamishness, however short-lived.) The obvious question to viewers of the film is whether we can do a bit better. To the guys in the white coats, saving the world means placating the monsters by blood sacrifice; to us, perhaps, saving the world would take just one person saying: "I feel guilty about this. Let's call it off," and acting on this impulse. But nobody ever does: in a gang culture, individual choices don't apply. And to the extent that the film aligns viewers outside of the film with the watchers inside, it clearly presumes that on the outside nobody would, either: that viewers, like watchers, might feel the slightest twinge of guilt, but hardly enough for more than a bit of hemming and hawing. Like so many horror films do, Cabin simultaneously takes its revenge on viewers for not experiencing guilt-by aligning them with the film's most despicable characters-and offers them a cop-out-by way of viewer identification (moral allegiance) with the victims.
Forcing us into the killer's perspective invites us to enjoy the violence, which-if we do-makes us feel guilty. In other words, horror film forces us to experience a guilt in particular (guilt for enjoying the destruction of another human being) that we should be feeling in general (guilt for destroying the environment, for example). Or, to turn this on its head, the horror film is payback for our failure to feel guilty for the social, economic, political and ecological horrors we inflict on the world and its inhabitants, particularly children. For our failure to feel guilty about being social predators, the horror film forces us into the role of a physical one.
The way the horror film induces guilt is by splitting alignment from allegiance, or, to use the more common terms, visual 'identity' from viewer 'identification.' The horror film is the only cinematic genre that routinely forces audience alignment with a character with whom most people cannot possibly identify-that of the killer-and locates identification, however half-heartedly, elsewhere, with either the victim or the hero. Watching horror films is like watching a reportage on the Iraq war while crying crocodile tears: if we voted for Bush or Blair, if we haven't spent every second of the second Iraq war on the streets protesting against it, we will most likely feel responsible for it, define ourselves, at least to some degree, as the guilty party, as the armchair perpetrators of that war. But our moral allegiance ('identification') with the victims sublimates our guilt to the extent that it can no longer spur us into action.
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This is what the horror film does: it confronts us, simultaneously, with our guilt and our mechanisms of suppressing guilt sufficiently to avoid acting upon it.
Alignment is the horror film's method of showcasing our guilt; allegiance is the horror film's version of crocodile tears.
Coda: Violence
Finally, a speculative question: is it possible to view the extreme violence of many horror films as the genre's response to the fact that viewers tend to be 39 Dika, who views the horror film's main concern as fear rather than guilt, has nevertheless hit very close to the mark in one passage: "the involvement with evil, from the necessary distance of innocence, is specifically formulated into the identification mechanism of the films. The identification with the killer's look allows direct involvement, while the moral identification with the heroine absolves the viewer of guilt" (Games of Terror 129).
understandably obtuse about their own guilty involvement? Of course, violence can simply be shrugged off by pointing at the obvious delights of titillation (not exactly a cheery view of the human race, that). But reading horror films as guilt trips might
give us a different perspective on violence. If, as I suspect, the horror film as a genre attempts to make us aware of the guilt we should be feeling but aren't, it runs constantly counter to our persistent determination not to go there. Clearly, a gentle hint will not do, and so the horror film hits us over the head with a hammer. 
